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Abstract 
The United States imposed trade sanctions against the military regime in Myanmar in 
July 2003. The import ban damaged the garment industry in particular. This industry 
exported nearly half of its products to the United States, and more than eighty percent of 
United States imports from Myanmar had been clothes. The garment industry was 
probably the main target of the sanctions. Nevertheless, the impact on the garment 
industry and its workers has not been accurately evaluated or closely examined. The 
purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the sanctions and to further 
understand the present situation. This is done using several sources of information, 
including the author’s field and questionnaire surveys. This paper also describes the 
process of selection and polarization underway in the garment industry, an industry that 
now has more severe competition fueled by the sanctions. Through such a process, the 
impact was inflicted disproportionately on small and medium-sized domestic firms and 
their workers. 
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1. Objectives 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of United States sanctions of July 
2003 on the garment industry and its workers in Myanmar and to further understand 
the present situation. 
United States President George W. Bush signed the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act of 2003 into law and made an executive order on July 28, 2003. This was 
a strong move by the United States government. It had been promised by then 
Secretary of State Colin Powell in response to Black Friday of May 30 of the same year. 
                                                  
∗ The author wishes to thank U Myint Soe, Chairman of MGMA, Dr. Aung Win, Vice 
Chairman of MGMA, U Moe Kyaw, Managing Director of MMRD, U Lutha Kyaw, 
Research Manager of MMRD, Ma Khin Sandy, Industrial Research Executive of MMRD, 
and Mr. Tomohiro Ando, Managing Director of the JETRO Yangon Office for their 
cooperation with survey administration. 
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On that date, the motorcade of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League for 
Democracy (NLD), was attacked by a large number of thugs in central Myanmar. 
Among other things, the legislation bans all import of Myanmar products to the United 
States. The executive order freezes the assets of senior Myanmar officials and prohibits 
any United States financial institutions from making transactions with entities in 
Myanmar. 
The embargo on all imports of “made-in-Myanmar” products damaged the garment 
industry in Myanmar in particular, since this industry exported nearly half of its 
products to the United States market. This industry was probably the biggest target of 
sanctions, because more than 80 % of total imports to the United Sates from Myanmar 
had been garments.1 Before sanctions were imposed, the garment industry in Myanmar 
had exhibited strong growth throughout the 1990’s, particularly in the late 1990’s, and 
at the beginning of the new century. Between 1990 and 2002, Myanmar’s garment 
manufacturing sector developed 55 times its initial export activity. It is generally 
believed that the garment industry in Myanmar had 400 firms with more than 300,000 
workers at its peak in the late 1990’s and up to 2001. 
Many anecdotal reports regarding the impact of United States sanctions on the 
garment industry have been written. For example, Prof. David I. Steinberg, prominent 
expert on Myanmar issues, wrote: 
Sixty-four textile factories have filed for closure in a two-week period. Some 80,000 jobs 
have already been lost and this will be followed by another 100,000, mostly young women 
who provide supplementary income for impoverished families. One recent academic 
inquiry in central Burma indicated that some of those let off are finding their way into the 
brothels. (Steinberg [2003]) 
The Myanmar government also criticized the United States indicating that more than 
80,000 garment factory workers lost their jobs (Ko Lay [2005]). An April 2004 U.S. State 
Department Report on Myanmar estimated that more than 100 garment factories had 
closed, and 50,000 to 60,000 jobs had been lost (U.S. Department of State [2004]). There 
are big discrepancies in the reported number of lost jobs, and this makes it difficult to 
form an accurate evaluation of the impact of United States sanctions on the garment 
industry. 
Apart from political intentions to manipulate the numbers, a major reason for such 
discrepancies is a lack of reliable statistics related to the industry’s situation. Further, 
                                                  
1 On the other hand, Myanmar’s exports to the United States constituted 26% in 2000, 
18% in 2001, and 15% in 2002 out of its total exports, according to the UN Comtrade. 
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very few studies or surveys have been done to measure the impact of United States 
sanctions on Myanmar’s garment industry and assess the present situation. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary for the two sides, the one that imposed the sanctions and 
the one that suffered from them, to know the real impact in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the sanctions and to consider either countermeasures for the side that 
suffered or future directions for the side that imposed them. The purpose of this paper is 
to develop knowledge and information in these areas of concern. 
The second section includes an estimate of the size of the garment industry at its peak 
and at present. This estimate is made as accurately as possible by using several sources 
of information including the author’s field and questionnaire surveys. 
The third section includes an examination of the actual impact of United States 
sanctions based on the estimated size of the garment industry determined in section 
two. The role that the United States market played in the growth of the garment 
industry in Myanmar is first reviewed so that the impact of its loss can be accurately 
evaluated. Impact is then examined in various aspects including export performance, 
processing charges (CMP charges), and capacity utilization. 
Section four includes an examination of who actually suffered from sanctions. 
Sanctions did not have an equal impact on related parties. In order to identify the 
victims, players or enterprises in the garment industry are first examined. This is 
followed by a description of the process of selection and polarization underway in the 
industry, an industry that now has more severe competition fueled by the sanctions. 
This section concludes with an examination of the impact on workers, the main victims 
of the sanctions. 
The conclusion includes a summary of arguments and an overall evaluation of the 
effectiveness of United States sanctions. 
 
2. The Size of the Garment Industry 
Dana, an established economic magazine in Burmese, featured an article on the 
garment industry in November 2000. It included an interview with U Myint Soe, 
Chairman of the Myanmar Garment Manufactures Association (MGMA). He said: 
As of March 2000, there are about 400 factories including small, medium and big ones, 
with more than 300,000 workers. It means there are many more family members 
dependent on this industry. The garment industry in Myanmar is already quite big. (Tin 
Aung Kyaw [2000:85]) 
These figures were frequently quoted, and they became established thereafter. 
However, these estimates are not supported by reliable statistics. The Myanmar 
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government provides very limited socio-economic statistics, and these are often 
unreliable and outdated. Neither the Myanmar government nor garment enterprises 
themselves accurately know the size of the industry. This section includes an estimate 
of the size of the industry using various sources of information including the author’s 
field and questionnaire surveys. 
 
(1) Export 
Export serves as the most reliable performance index for the garment industry. Most 
garment industries in Myanmar, like those in other developing economies, operate on 
the basis of Cutting, Making, and Packing (CMP) arrangements. Overseas buyers do 
everything but production; they find customers, design clothes with detailed 
specifications, and procure and supply raw materials to apparel plants in Myanmar. 
These plants do the cutting, sewing, and packing. They then re-export all the products 
to overseas markets.2 
Figure 2-1 shows the export performance of the garment industry in Myanmar. This is 
based on three different sources of information: (1) the United Nations Comtrade, (2) 
Myanmar government statistics, and (3) import data of 22 major countries that import 
Myanmar-made clothes. Statistics Canada constructs the World Trade Database based 
on UN Comtrade, and the database retrieval services were used for this paper. For 
developing Myanmar government statistics, the Statistical Yearbook (hereafter SY) and 
Selected Monthly Economic Indicators (hereafter SMEI) were used. The export figures 
of these statistical books use the denomination of Kyats, Myanmar’s domestic currency. 
The official exchange rate was used for conversion.3 Twenty-two countries that are 
thought to be major importers of Myanmar-made clothes were selected based on the 
author’s field surveys in Yangon in 2005.4 The author used the World Trade Atlas 
(hereafter WTA) database retrieval services to determine imports of clothes from 
Myanmar to these selected countries. 
According to the UN Comtrade, export of Myanmar-made clothes increased steadily 
through the 1990’s up to 1998, when it reached about US $270 million. The following 
two years, 1999 and 2000, witnessed remarkable growth that caused a garment 
industry “boom” in Yangon. At this time, garments occupied about 40% of total exports 
of the country, the top export item. This peaked in 2001 with an export value of US $868 
                                                  
2 See Kudo [2005a: 30-31] for more detailed explanation on the CMP arrangements. 
3 The official exchange rate is pegged at about 6 Kyats per US$1, whereas the parallel 
exchange rate is around 1200 and 1300 Kyats per US$1 in November, 2005.  
4 See Table 3-1 for names of the 22 countries. 
 7
million. However, it declined by 20% in the next year. 
Export performance of the garment industry, according to data from the 22 selected 
countries, follows the pattern exhibited by the UN Comtrade. Figures for this 
performance are a bit lower than those of the UN Comtrade, probably because there are 
countries other than the selected 22 which import Myanmar-made clothes. The data 
series is available through 2004, and it shows a consecutive three-year decline for 2002, 
2003, and 2004. It is noteworthy that in 2003, the year United States sanctions were 
imposed, only a slight decrease was experienced. Myanmar-made clothes were 
somewhere in the pipeline from ex-factory to market up to the 3rd quarter of 2003. It is 
also noteworthy that 2002 witnessed a bigger decline (-19%) than 2004 (-17%). As early 
as 2001, the garment industry in Myanmar had been annoyed by increasing consumer 
boycotts in the United States and European markets. Accordingly, big buyers, who sell 
brand-name goods and tend to be conscious of social compliance, became hesitant to 
purchase Myanmar-made products. These buyers included renowned multinational 
retailers such as Levi Strauss, Reebok and British Home Stores (EIU [2004: 33]). This 
situation was further exacerbated by a general slowdown of the world economy, and in 
particular that of the United States. United States sanctions then deprived Myanmar’s 
garment industry of access to its markets in mid-2003. As a result, the export value 
recorded for 2004 was only 66% that of 2001. 
In contrast to these two data series, Myanmar government statistics show quite a 
different picture. They show that the export value grew rather slowly but steadily up to 
FY 1998.5 It then grew by leaps and bounds in the following two years. The export 
value in FY 1999 nearly doubled and that recorded in FY 2000 quadrupled.6 It started 
to decline one year earlier than seen in the pattern derived from the other two data 
series. It witnessed big declines in FY 2001 (-24 %) and in FY 2002 (-29%), revealing big 
discrepancies between Myanmar statistics and the other two data series. 
There may be many factors that cause discrepancies among the three information 
sources regarding trade terms such as FOB and CIF, commodity classifications7, 
                                                  
5 FY stands for Fiscal Year, starting from April and ending in March. 
6 Such a jump in FY 2000 seems inconsistent even with figures in the same statistical 
series of SMEI. According to SMEI, the unit price of an exported garment increased 
from US $1 per piece in FY 1999 to US $2.2 per piece in FY 2000. There seem to be no 
factors leading to such a considerable increase in the unit price for this year. On the 
contrary, the export volume (pieces) almost doubled in FY 2000 according to SMEI; this 
is more consistent with the UN Comtrade and WTA data series. 
7 In this paper, SITC84 (articles of apparel and clothing accessories) are defined as 
garments for the UN Comtrade. HS61 (knitted apparel) and HS62 (woven apparel) are 
defined as garments for World Trade Atlas. For Myanmar government statistics, the 
 8
recording points such as exports and imports, and methods of rectifying errors and 
omissions. Taking all these factors into account, however, it is still difficult to explain 
such big differences among information sources. 
The export value recorded in Myanmar statistics is usually much lower than that in 
the other two data series. The export value reported by the UN Comtrade is larger than 
that in Myanmar statistics, specifically 1.3 times in CY2000/FY2000 and 3.6 times in 
CY1998/FY1998.8 One reason often given is that exporters attempt to evade export tax. 
The so-called “export tax” is levied on almost all exports at the rate of 10%. This is 
legally composed of an 8% commercial tax and a 2% profit tax. Local businessmen claim 
that there is a considerable amount of under-reporting of garment exports in order to 
evade the export tax. Such practice surely contributes to discrepancies between the two 
sets of figures. Nevertheless, it does not seem sufficient to explain the gap, because wide 
differences existed before the introduction of the export tax in January 1999. Actually, 
the biggest gap occurred in CY1998/FY1998. Further, an export tax had been levied on 
CMP charges (processing charges) at the rate of 2% only up to October 2003 when the 
rate was increased to 10%, similar to that for other commodities. Until then, garment 
exporters were probably less motivated to evade the export tax due to the lowered rate. 
Another reason for the discrepancy that is often pointed out is the exchange rate 
problem. There is a big gap between the official exchange rate and the parallel market 
rate. External transactions seem to be recorded at the official exchange rate of about 6 
Kyats per US $1. At the same time, it is said that the customs offices had used different 
evaluation rates such as 100 Kyats per US $1 for priority goods and 120 Kyats per US 
$1 for luxurious goods since June 1996 (OECF [1996:46]).9 If these rates were used for 
recording external transactions, the calculated export value would be about 17 to 20 
times larger after 1996. This is unrealistic. The official exchange rate is probably used 
for recording external transactions, and this means that the almost fixed exchange rate 
has been applied for recording. It is difficult to find a single culprit to blame for the gaps. 
The problem may be more deeply rooted in collection of statistics and in the reporting 
systems of this country. 
A general picture of the export performance of Myanmar’s garment industry is as 
follows: It steadily increased from the early 1990’s to 1998. The following couple of years 
witnessed rapid growth in exports, creating a garment industry boom in Yangon. 
                                                                                                                                                  
column of “garment” is selected. 
8 CY stands for Calendar Year, starting from January and ending in December. 
9 These different exchange rates used at the customs offices were again increased to the 
uniform rate of 450 Kyats per US $1 in June 2004. 
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However, this did not last long. After having reached a peak in either FY 2000 or CY 
2001, a considerable and consecutive decline followed to 2004. 
 
(2) Firms 
MGMA estimates that about 400 garment firms or factories existed at the peak of the 
industry around 2000 and 2001. This estimate included about 100 small factories that 
had a few tens of sewing machines and specialized in subcontracted works. Being 
affected by United States sanctions, many firms stopped production, dismissed workers, 
and went bankrupt. The number of garment firms or factories decreased to about 180 by 
mid-2005, and most small subcontractors were swept out.10 As mentioned before, 
however, this estimate is not supported by reliable statistics. 
There are several information sources available to determine the number of firms. 
These include registration data at the Directorate of Industrial Supervision and 
Inspection (hereafter DISI) of the Ministry of Industry (1)11, business directories, 
company-wise export data, and the Survey on Garment Industry in Myanmar of 2005 
(hereafter SGIM). 12 
According to the Private Industrial Enterprise Law enacted in November 1990, any 
private industrial enterprises using the energy of three horsepower and above and/or 
employing ten or more wage-earning workers are required to register with the DISI. 
According to DISI data, there were 232 factories out of a total of 41,510 private 
industries that registered as garment factories as of August 2005.13 This number 
probably includes factories producing only for the domestic market, and these are not of 
primary interest in this paper. According to DISI data, the average number of 
employees per factory was about 80 people in 2000. This is quite small compared to the 
SGIM figures that showed 433 people per firm in 2002. There may be many entities that 
do not register themselves with the DISI. According to SGIM, only 77 out of 142 firms 
registered themselves at the DISI. It is difficult to estimate the number of 
export-oriented garment factories using the DISI data. 
The Myanmar Textile and Garment Directory (hereafter MTGD) is the most useful 
business directory. This directory was published for the first time in FY 2001 and for the 
                                                  
10 Interview with U Myint Soe, Chairman of MGMA, in Yangon in June 2005. 
11 There are two ministries named Ministry of Industry (1) and (2). The former is 
mainly in charge of light industry such as foodstuff and textiles; the latter is mainly in 
charge of heavy industry such as machineries and automobiles. 
12 See Appendix: Survey on Garment Industry in Myanmar (2005) for details. 
13 Kanaung Journal, Vol.7, No.43, October 26, 2005. The DISI registration figures are 
occasionally disclosed in magazines and journals, but not on a regular basis. 
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second time in FY 2002. The latest version is now being compiled. MTGD includes not 
only garment factories but also longyi weavers, dyeing and printing services, traders of 
sewing and embroidery machines, forwarders, and others. The “garment factories” 
category is selected for analysis here. The list of garment factories includes company 
name, address, telephone and fax numbers, e-mail account, factory location, production 
items and volume, number of machines and employees, year established, export 
markets, and investment type. 
There were 293 garment firms in MTGD for FY 2001 and 275 garment firms for FY 
2002.14 Given no legal mandate to collect information, the directory naturally does not 
thoroughly cover all the population of garment manufacturers. SGIM asked garment 
firms whether or not they were included in MTGD of FY 2001. Out of 142 firms 
questioned, 86 were included, 42 were established after the survey for MTGD of FY 
2001, and 14 firms were not included even though they existed at that time. Taking 
such an omission ratio into account, it is estimated there were about 330 firms in FY 
2001 and 310 firms in FY 2002. However, the number may include some micro and 
small entities that make clothes for domestic markets only. About 100 firms listed in 
MTGD of FY 2002 did not have information about export markets. They could have 
been subcontractors of garment exporters or manufactures for the domestic market or 
both.15 
Export data is a good source for identifying garment firms in Myanmar. However, 
company-wise export data is not easily available in this country. It appears occasionally 
in domestic magazines, journals, pamphlets, and in other publications, but there is no 
consistency. The author gathered some data from these sources and combined them 
with other information such as SGIM. In this fashion, reconstructed company-wise 
export data for the period between FY 1998 and FY 2004 could be produced. JETRO 
[1999] provides company-wise export data for clothes in the period between FY 1993 
and FY 1997. The two sets of data were connected to cover the whole period between FY 
1993 and FY 2004. It is difficult to verify the accuracy of the reconstructed data. 
However, the total export value of garments shown in SY and SMEI almost equals the 
total sum of company-wise export data except for FY 1999 and FY 2000.16 It is 
                                                  
14 In the case of separate entries for head offices and factories, the author counted all of 
these as one firm. Some firms engaging in different manufacturing processes like 
spinning and weaving were excluded from counting. 
15 Of course, this could be just due to a lack of information on export markets of each 
firm. 
16 Except for FY1999 and FY2000, the differences between the two data sets are a 
couple of percentages. As for FY1999, the company-wise export data is larger than that 
 11
reasonably consistent with Myanmar government statistics. A careful interpretation of 
the data is required. 
Based on the reconstructed export data, garment firms with exports are identified. 
Note that there are many non-garment firms that exported garments. Examples of 
companies exporting garments include: Myanmar Airways (an airline company), 
Myanmar Brewery (a beer brewer), Myanmar Korea Timber International (a 
wood-based industry) and several trading firms. They are excluded from the count, but 
due to a lack of company information, all non-garment firms could not be left out. Note 
also that companies that accumulated exports of only US $10,000 or less for the period 
between FY 1993 and FY 2004 are excluded as well. This presupposes that these 
companies did not have substantial production facilities as garment manufacturer. 
Table 2-1 shows the number of garment firms with export year by year. There were 
only 12 garment firms with exports in FY 1993; this suggests that the industry was still 
in its rudimentary stage. The number of firms increased steadily up to FY 1997. The 
next year (FY 1998) saw rapid growth from 94 to 232, consistent with the export 
performance. Rapid growth in export value was made possible by the entry of new 
garment industries. After recording its peak in FY 1999, the number of firms declined 
consecutively for five-years. It is noteworthy that FY 2001 saw a big decline, even when 
compared to the one in FY 2004, a year obviously affected by United States sanctions. 
The “boom” in Yangon was gone two years before the sanctions. 
It is only from the SGIM that the latest number of garment firms in Myanmar can be 
known. In order to do this survey, the author, with the cooperation of MGMA and a 
marketing research company in Yangon, sought to construct a complete list of existing 
garment firms in mid-2005. Original information gathered for MTGD was used, and 165 
garment firms were identified as being in operation. The actual survey was done on 142 
firms, however, because 22 firms declined requests for interviews, and one firm was 
already in liquidation. Out of 142 firms interviewed, only 78 had exports in FY 2004; 54 
firms were engaged in both exports and subcontracting; 20 firms sold their products 
only in domestic markets in FY 2004. 
In total, the number of garment firms was about 300 at its peak around 2000 and 
2001. It shrunk to about 160 or 180 at most by 2004 after United States sanctions. A 
so-called “established” figure of 400 firms at peak is not supported by any data. 
 
(3) Employment 
                                                                                                                                                  
of SY by 24%; as for FY2000, it is smaller by 39% on the contrary. 
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The estimated numbers of jobs lost due to United States sanctions varies greatly. Such 
variation is due to the lack of an accurate estimate of the size of employment in the 
garment industry in Myanmar. According to MGMA, more than 300,000 workers were 
employed in the garment industry at its peak. Being affected by the United States 
sanctions, the number of workers decreased to about 120,000 to 130,000 by mid-2005.17 
However, as stated, such estimates lack supporting statistics. 
The first information source used to assess employment was the DISI. The latest 
figures (from 2000) are rather outdated. There were 12,863 workers in 160 garment 
factories in 2000. However, the DISI data may fail to capture a picture of the entire 
industry under the scope of this paper because it includes factories producing for 
domestic markets only and also omits entities that should be registered. It is difficult to 
accept numbers from the DISI as an accurate base for estimation. 
The second information source used was the survey conducted in 2005. In SGIM, the 
average number of workers employed by each firm in 2002, 2003, and 2004 was asked. 
There were 56,923 workers for 130 firms in 2002, 52,893 workers for 138 firms in 2003, 
and 47,501 workers for 142 firms in 2004. The number of workers dwindled by 17% for 
these years. Note, however, that SGIM questionnaires were sent only to firms that were 
operating in June 2005. It did not cover firms that had already exited the market by 
then. As Kudo [2005b] reported, there were probably many cases of immediate factory 
closure. Thus, SGIM likely underestimates the impact of United States sanction in 
terms of jobs lost. 
For analysis, assume that data for the average number of workers per firm is valid. 
These numbers were 438 for 2002, 383 for 2003, and 335 for 2004.18 According to the 
MTGD for FY 2002, the average number of workers per firm was 410, and this figure 
almost matches with that of SGIM. Suppose that the average number of workers per 
firm was 450 at its peak around 2000 and 2001, and the number of firms was 300. Then 
the total employment in the garment industry may be estimated to be about 135,000 
people. Further suppose that the average number of workers per firm was 340 in 2004, 
and the number of firms was about 160 to 180. Then the total employment may be 
estimated to be about 55,000 to 61,000 people. A so-called “established” number of more 
than 300,000 workers at the peak of the garment industry cannot be endorsed.19 
                                                  
17 Interview with U Myint Soe, Chairman of MGMA, in Yangon in June 2005. 
18 Note that 22 firms, including some big entities, declined to answer the questionnaires. 
This may distort how representative samples are in terms of the distribution of number 
of workers. 
19 If there were 300,000 workers in 400 firms, the average number of workers per firm 
would be 750. This number is supported neither by MTGD nor by SGIM. 
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(4) FDI 
The textile and clothing sectors can be seen as a supply chain consisting of a number 
of discrete activities (Norås [2004:3]). The garment industry located in a developing 
economy also forms a part of such a supply chain, and it is often integrated and 
controlled by multinational retailers. The nature of the textile and clothing industry is 
such that most garment firms are part of some larger multinational corporations. This 
takes the form of foreign direct investment in many developing countries such as 
Cambodia, Mauritius and Mongolia (Kee [2005:3]). Although domestic firms play a key 
role in the garment industry in Myanmar, the industry has also received a certain 
amount of foreign direct investment. 
As of February 2005, 391 FDI projects worth US $7.7 billion had been approved. 
Among these, 152 projects belonged to the manufacturing sector and were worth US 
$1.6 billion. This sector ranked first in terms of number of projects and second in terms 
of the capital amount.20 Breakdown figures by sub-sectors are not available. Garment 
firms with foreign equity based on the aforementioned reconstructed company-wise 
export data were counted. There were 45 garment firms with foreign equity; 31 of these 
had 100% foreign investment; and 14 companies had joint ventures with state-owned, 
military-related, or private firms. If each company has one FDI project (a likely 
scenario), the garment industry would constitute about 30% of all manufacturing based 
foreign investments in terms of the number of projects. The garment industry functions 
as a window open to foreign investment, associated technology transfer, and access to 
overseas markets. 
 
(5) Contribution to the National Economy 
The garment industry is said to play an important role in the early stage of economic 
development, and this is certainly the economic stage where Myanmar is located. It is 
labor-intensive, export-oriented, and it utilizes standardized technology. It can offer 
entry-level jobs for unskilled labor, it earns foreign exchange necessary to pay for 
imported raw materials and investment capital goods, and it requires relatively low 
investment and start-up costs for entrepreneurs. Such characteristics have made the 
garment industry suitable as a first rung on the industrialization ladder in developing 
economies. Some have actually experienced a very high output growth rate in the sector 
                                                  
20 The oil and gas sector consists of 65 projects worth US $2.5 billion and is ranked 
second in terms of number of projects. It is ranked first in terms of capital amount. 
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(Nordås [2004]). 
The industrial sector in Myanmar is extremely underdeveloped. Myanmar falls 
behind other new member ASEAN countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam 
(CLV). These countries also embarked on a transition toward a market economy at 
about the same time as Myanmar. A glimpse at Table 2-2 clearly shows the industrial 
stagnation in Myanmar. 21 On the other hand, CLV countries increased their share of 
the industrial sector throughout the 1990’s and at the beginning of the new century. 
Garment manufacturing was one of the leading industries in these countries. 
The industrial sector in Myanmar constituted only 13% of the GDP in 2002. The 
contribution of the garment industry is no doubt much smaller, though no data is 
available to indicate its share. According to DISI data, as of August 2005, 232 garment 
factories constituted less than one percent of 41,910 total registered factories (Kanaung 
Journal [2005]). Rice mills ranked first with 15,260 factories (36%). This was followed 
by edible oil mills with 3,554 factories (8%), sawmills with 2,400 factories (6%), and 
textile weaving works with 1,587 factories (4%). Most of these are basic processing 
factories of primary products. 
The garment industry has the potential to create large-scale job opportunities because 
it is so highly labor-intensive. To what extent does the garment industry contribute to 
the national economy in terms of job creation in Myanmar? The statistics on 
employment by sector has been publicly released only up to FY 1997 ([MNPED: 1998]). 
According to this, there were 18.4 million people employed: 63% in agriculture, 10% in 
trade, and 9% in processing and manufacturing. The estimated employment of the 
garment industry in and around 2000 and 2001 occupied less than 1% of the total 
employment and about 8% of employment in the processing and manufacturing sector. 
Since FY 1997, the labor force has been increasing, and the share of industrial sector 
has risen slightly. This means that the share of employment in the garment industry 
has grown even smaller in either the national economy or in the manufacturing sector. 
The garment industry has yet to alleviate the widespread unemployment and 
underemployment on the national level in Myanmar. 
The garment industry is also expected to be a foreign exchange earner. As examined 
earlier, its exports were recorded as US $868 million at its highest. Until the mid-1990’s, 
when garment export surfaced, Myanmar’s main export commodities were primary 
products such as beans and pulses, fish and prawns, and teak (Table 2-3). Garments 
                                                  
21 Regarding the industrial policy and changes during the transitional period between 
the early 1990s and 2005, see Kudo [2001] [2005a]. 
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had ranked first in export since 1998, when the share reached 24%. Due to the decline 
in garment export in 2002, however, it lost top rank to a “non identified product”, most 
likely natural gas exported to Thailand through the pipeline. The garment industry 
assumed an important position in terms of export but this does not necessarily mean 
that it became a major foreign exchange earner. As mentioned earlier, most of the 
garment firms were operating on a CMP basis, where labor is the only major input into 
production. It is said that CMP charges or processing fees constitute only 10% of FOB 
prices. In spite of its apparently huge export value, garment exports generate less 
genuine foreign exchange revenue for the country than primary product export items 
such as beans and pulses or natural gas. 
The garment industry is also a channel of technology transfer. It is often regarded as a 
low value-added industry, employing only unskilled labor with low wages and using 
conventional technology with no innovation. In reality, however, it is an important 
channel of technological and managerial transfer. As shown in the DISI data, most 
factories in Myanmar are engaged in basic processing of primary products rather than 
complex manufacturing of industrial goods. The garment industry is virtually the only 
modern mass-production-based manufacturer with a large number of organized workers. 
Myanmar entrepreneurs have learned the method of mass production and even “factory 
culture” by cutting, sewing and packing the clothes. Surveys in other developing 
economies also report a considerable technological and managerial transfer effect in this 
industry (Goto [2003]). 
The garment industry has not yet developed enough to be a leading industry in 
Myanmar. Its contribution to the national economy is limited in terms of both job 
creation and foreign exchange earning. However, it is virtually the only industry that 
practices modern mass-production-based manufacturing as part of global supply chain 
of the textile and clothing industry. In this sense, the garment industry provides a 
starting point for industrial and technological upgrading in the future. 
 
3. Measuring Impacts 
As a whole, the garment industry in Myanmar lost about 70,000 to 80,000 jobs with 
the closure of about 150 firms/factories since its peak to mid-2005. Such loss was caused 
mainly by the Unites States sanctions of 2003. However, the garment industry started 
to decline one or two years before the sanctions. A pre-sanction decline may be regarded 
as part of the impact of United States sanctions. Buyers restrained themselves from 
buying made-in-Myanmar clothes for fear of prospective sanctions by the United States. 
This section focuses on more direct impacts of sanctions on the garment industry. 
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Such is viewed from various aspects including not only export performance but also 
CMP charges and capacity utilization. Before this, however, the role that the United 
States market played in the growth of Myanmar’s garment industry must be explored 
so that a fair evaluation can be made of the impact of its loss. 
 
(1) The United States and EU Markets under the MFA Regime 
Throughout the 1990’s, about 90% of the demand for Myanmar-made clothes had been 
provided by the markets of the United States and the EU. According to Table 3-1, the 
share of the United States market for Myanmar-made clothes was 45% in 1997; that of 
the EU was 50%. Since then, the share of the United States market had steadily 
increased to 54% in 2000. However, many buyers for the United States market had 
restrained themselves from purchasing Myanmar-made clothes because of concerns 
about the bad record of human rights and democracy in Myanmar as well as consumer 
boycott movements in the United States. 
Why had the garment industry in Myanmar received orders from the United States 
and the EU markets? One important reason was that under the Multi Fiber Agreement 
(MFA), Myanmar had enjoyed an unrestricted quota position, either no quotas, or 
non-binding quotas. The MFA, which came into force in 1974, applied quantitative 
restrictions (quotas) to imports from developing countries. The MFA was followed by the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC); this came into force with the establishment 
of the WTO in 1995. The United States and the EU also applied quotas under the 
MFA/ATC regime (Norås [2004:13-15]).22 The MFA regime was abolished on 1 January 
2005. 
Myanmar enjoyed having no quotas for the EU market; it could export freely as long 
as orders came. The United States imposed quotas on only six woven items including 
men’s shirts and trousers. Knitwear had no quotas. Buyers came to Yangon searching 
for either no quota items or unfilled quota items. The export of no quota items certainly 
contributed to the rapid growth of the garment industry in Myanmar. As an example, 
the export of knitwear to the United States, on which no quotas had been imposed, 
occupied nearly 70% of the total export to that country during the rapidly growing 
period between 1997 and 2002. 
At the same time, the export volume of six quota items also increased remarkably in 
1999 and 2000. Such an increase was made possible by the improved use of quotas. 
According to Table 3-2, the filled ratio of quotas was also improved in the same years. It 
                                                  
22 For convenience, “MFA” rather than “ATC” is used in this paper. 
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is said that the quotas had long been monopolized by the Myanmar Textile Industry 
(MTI), a state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of Industry (1), the Union of 
Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL), a military-related enterprise, and 
their joint ventures with foreign firms. Even though there were no announced reforms 
in the allocation of quotas, there certainly were implicit changes so that private firms, 
including those that were 100% foreign, could have access to them. As a result, the 
export volume of items with quotas constituted about 20% of all export volume to the 
United States in 1999 and 2000. The garment industry in Myanmar certainly enjoyed 
the MFA regime for its support of rapid growth.23 
 
(2) Export Performance, CMP Charges and Capacity Utilization 
United States sanctions of 2003 substantially damaged the garment industry in 
Myanmar. The most obvious indication of this damage was the sharp decline in exports 
immediately after the sanctions were implemented. The export value as well as volume 
was cut in half due to the sanctions (Figure 3-1). The decrease was almost equal to the 
market share that the United States occupied. As of January 2005, the latest time for 
which export data is available, no sign of recovery has been observed. 
To make the things worse, the real impact was probably larger than what seemed 
apparent in the indicated decline of export value and volume. As previously noted, CMP 
charges are the only genuine income for Myanmar’s garment firms, and they 
constituted about 10% of export value or FOB prices. A decline in the export of US $100 
to US $90 means a decline by 10% in terms of export value. However, it may also mean a 
decline as high as 50% in terms of CMP charges that may drop from US$10 to US$5. 
What really mattered for garment firms in Myanmar was the sharp decline in CMP 
charges. 
In SGIM, garment firms were asked whether or not CMP charges changed in 2005 as 
compared to 2004. Out of 79 responses, 47 firms (60%) answered that it “decreased”, 
while 26 firms (33%) replied that it was the “same”. The degree to which CMP charges 
decreased was in most cases less than 30%. Note, however, that CMP charges in 2004 
had most probably already declined, having been affected by the United States 
sanctions of 2003. Many business people in the garment industry in Myanmar deplored 
the drastic decline of CMP charges after the sanctions (Kudo [2005b]). While garment 
                                                  
23 Note that the rapid growth of the garment industry in Myanmar was not due solely 
to the MFA regime. To a certain degree, it also had an international competitiveness 
because of its abundant, cheap, and relatively well-educated labor force. See Moe Kyaw 
[2001] and Kudo [2002] [2005b]. 
 18
firms in Myanmar craved orders to maintain their workforce and machines, buyers beat 
the price and took advantage of their plight. 
The capacity utilization ratio also declined after the sanctions. According to SGIM, the 
average capacity utilization ratio was 95% for 130 firms in 2002, and this fell to 77% for 
142 firms in 2004. The number of firms with low capacity utilization ratios of 70% or 
less also increased from 8 firms in 2002 to 53 firms in 2004 (Table 3-3). Domestic 
companies in particular suffered from low capacity utilization ratios. There were 29 
firms with operation utilization ratios of 50% or less, and they were all domestic firms. 
On the other hand, companies that were 100% foreign maintained relatively high 
capacity utilization ratios. United States sanctions made competition in the industry 
more severe, and this impacted garment firms unevenly. 
 
4. Who Suffers? 
United States sanctions damaged the garment industry in Myanmar in a serious 
manner. However, firms and workers did not feel the impact evenly. Those most affected 
were small and medium-sized domestic private firms and their workers, and these were 
obviously not the main target of the sanctions. 
The garment industry in Myanmar experienced more severe competition under a 
hostile international economic environment. The process of selection and polarization 
progresses and is fueled by the sanctions. In such a process, some firms survive and 
some die. In order to know what entities were actually affected by the sanctions, current 
changes in the garment industry will be examined. Before this, however, it is important 
to review the history of the garment industry in Myanmar from the viewpoint of firms’ 
entries. In this way, knowledge about who were there before the sanctions can be 
gained. 
 
(1) Brief History of the Entry of Firms 
The military government initiated an open door policy immediately after its seizure of 
power in 1988. At this time, several garment firms were formed as joint ventures in the 
early 1990’s between state-owned24 and military-related enterprises in Myanmar and 
Korean and Hong Kong companies (Table 4-1). MTI, a state-owned textile enterprise, 
established five joint ventures with Hong Kong companies by 1994 and one with a 
Singapore company in 1995. UMEHL set up two joint ventures with Daewoo group 
                                                  
24 Regarding the state-owned enterprises in Myanmar, see OECF [1996] and Nishizawa 
[2000]. 
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companies (Daewoo Corporation and Segye Corporation) in 1990 and one with a Hong 
Kong company in 1992. According to the aforementioned export data, tabled by company, 
these joint ventures exported 95% of the total garments exported from Myanmar in FY 
1993 (Table 4-2). 
There seem to be several reasons why foreign companies chose state-owned and 
military-related enterprises as their counterparts. 25 First, state-owned and 
military-related enterprises looked reliable and secure since they were in power. 
Foreign companies shunned political risk after the military government opened its door 
to foreign capital a couple of years ago. Second, private entrepreneurs and enterprises 
had not yet developed in those days. There were no capable private enterprises, in 
terms of both managerial and technological skills as well as financial capability. Third, 
these companies expected to enjoy the quota allocation for the United States market by 
forming joint ventures with public and semi-public entities. Fourth, and most 
importantly, 100% foreign investments in the garment industry were probably not yet 
allowed by the government. It is likely that the government did not allow 100% foreign 
investment in this industry at that time, even though it was legally permissible by the 
Foreign Investment Law of 1988. 
The first 100% foreign investment in the garment industry was made possible in 1994. 
After this, many successors followed (Table 2-1). The military government advanced its 
open door policy and economic liberalization in the mid-1990’s. It is probably not a 
coincidence that the first 100% foreign investment was permitted in the garment sector 
in this period. FDI inflows had been spurred forward by the release of NLD leader Aung 
San Suu Kyi from her six-year house arrest in 1995. As a result, highest FDI inflows 
were recorded in 1996. The export share of 100% foreign enterprises accordingly 
increased, while that of MTI and UMEHL joint ventures declined (Table 4-2). There are 
45 firms with foreign equity. Of these, 31 are wholly-owned by foreign entities, 9 are 
joint ventures with MTI and UMEHL, and 5 are joint ventures with private firms. 
Korea has the largest number of related firms (17 entities), followed by Hong Kong (13 
entities). 
Domestic private firms in Myanmar were rather slow to enter the garment industry. 
As far as can be ascertained, the first entry of domestic private enterprise into the 
                                                  
25 The account here is primarily based on the author’s interviews in September 2005 in 
Yangon and Bago with Mr. S from Korea and Mr. W from Hong Kong. Mr. S was the 
managing director of Myanmar Daewoo from 1993 to 2000 and has become an advisor to 
a prominent business group in Myanmar. Mr. W arrived in Yangon in 1991 as chief 
engineer of a joint venture company with MTI and has become the managing director of 
one of the leading foreign garment firms in Myanmar. 
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garment industry was made in 1994.26 The number of domestic private firms has 
gradually increased since then. It was only in 1998 that Myanmar entrepreneurs 
entered into the industry in full strength, causing a “boom” in Yangon. According to 
Table 2-1, the numbers of domestic private firms with export records jumped from 77 in 
FY 1997 to 213 in FY 1998 and further to 270 in FY 1999. 
The garment industry boom arose from strong demands of United States and EU 
markets. However, markets conditions were not the only cause for the boom. Affected by 
the 1997 Asian financial and economic crisis, the Myanmar economy had been beset by 
huge trade and current deficits. The military government adopted a so-called “export 
first policy”, in which only those with “export earnings” were allowed to import. 
However, CMP arrangements remained a way to have imports without export earnings. 
As previously mentioned, overseas buyers with their own financing provide almost all 
raw materials such as fabrics and buttons to garment factories in Myanmar. Myanmar 
firms do not need to pay for their imports with their own “export earnings”. The actual 
external financial transaction occurs with the remittance of processing fees to the 
garment firms in Myanmar by overseas buyers after their receipt of products. The CMP 
arrangements made it possible for the garment industry in Myanmar to develop rapidly 
by providing a way for domestic enterprises to avoid “import” problems.27 
However, some businessmen apparently misused it. Under CMP arrangements, they 
tried to import other goods besides raw materials for the production of clothes. Sales of 
imported goods were quite profitable under strict import restrictions. Businessmen 
often said, “They export in order to import”. By way of CMP arrangements, some people 
entered into the garment industry only because they wanted to import. Further the 
burst of bubbly real estate markets in 1997 pushed Myanmar businessmen forward to 
enter the garment industry. This industry was seen as one of the few somewhat feasible 
businesses at the time. As a result, as is often the case with booms, the garment 
industry “boom” in Yangon also had a bubble element that included enterprises without 
managerial skills, technology, capital and even access to markets. Sooner or later, they 
were destined to face difficulties. 
 
(2) Selection and Polarization 
The garment industry entered into more severe competition as orders sharply 
declined. Severe competition enhanced the process of selection and polarization among 
                                                  
26 There were several records of export for private firms in FY 1993. However, these 
may be trading or similar firms without substantial production capacity. 
27 See Kudo [2005a] for a detailed discussion. 
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firms in the industry. The Gini Concentration Ratio is useful to measure the degree of 
overall inequality present in an output distribution of an industry. “Export” will stand 
as good proxy for output of the garment industry in Myanmar, since all produced clothes 
are exported overseas. Based on the reconstructed company-wise export data, Gini 
Ratios were calculated for FY 2000 and FY 2004.28 The Gini Ratio was 0.75 for FY 2000 
and 0.60 for FY 2004. A lower Gini Ratio generally indicates a more equal distribution. 
The question then arises as to whether or not the output distribution in the garment 
industry in Myanmar became more equal in the period between the time that United 
States sanctions were not in place and afterwards. It did not. An apparent equalization 
in the industry was caused by the demise of micro and small-scale firms with export 
records. There were 41 firms with export values of US $10,000 or less in FY 2000. The 
number of such firms decreased to only nine in FY 2004. Faced with dwindled demand 
and intensified competition, there was no room left for the weak to survive in the 
garment industry. At the same time, a concentration of top enterprises was observed. 
While the five top firms occupied 15% of total export in FY 2000, they occupied 20% in 
FY 2004. 
SGIM also found polarization in progress. According to Table 4-3, there were eleven 
large-scale firms with more than 1,000 workers in both FY 2003 and FY 2004. The 
number of medium-sized firms with from 501 to 1,000 workers decreased from 22 in FY 
2003 to 15 in FY 2004, but small-scale firms with 100 workers or less increased from 38 
in FY 2003 to 51 in FY 2004. As a whole, on the one hand, large-sized firms successfully 
maintained their operations in spite of an unfavorable market environment, and on the 
other hand, medium-sized firms tended to reduce their workforce resulting in smaller 
sizes. It is also noteworthy that in contrast to domestic firms, firms with either whole or 
partial foreign equity seem to have been able to keep their labor force in the period 
between the time that sanctions were not in place and afterwards. Foreign-related firms 
had their parent companies, and these companies had market information, global sales 
networks, and could seek orders on behalf of their Myanmar subsidiaries. Domestic 
firms, which did not have any parent company, easily lost their buyers and markets. 
Many domestic firms had no choice but to reduce the number of workers or close their 
factories. Thus the share of exports from foreign firms increased since the garment 
industry entered a period of stagnation (Table 4-2). 
                                                  
28  Note that the author used all exports by all companies including apparent 
non-garment firms and firms with accumulated export value of US $10,000 or less for 
the period between FY 1993 and FY 2004 for convenience of calculation. There were 313 
firms with export records in FY 2000 and 147 firms in FY 2004. The numbers of 
identified firms are different from those in the previous section. 
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Last, productivity gaps among the different types of firms may be observed. 
Productivity is very important in markets with fierce competition. Table 4-4 shows 
productivity tabled by different types of firms. Note that 130 firms engaged mainly in 
sewing processes were selected, excluding four sweater knitters, six embroidery 
specialists and one dyeing firm.29 According to Table 4-4, foreign joint ventures show 
the highest productivity, followed by wholly-owned foreign firms. The productivity of 
domestic private firms falls behind them. Interesting is the fact that the number of 
sewing machines30 per worker was almost same among the different types of firms, and 
this was supposed to represent a capital equipment ratio. Workers’ skills, production 
management, and the order size in lots must be important factors in causing 
productivity gaps. Some domestic firms with low productivity were probably forced out 
of the market when competition increased following the sanctions. 
 
(3) Workers 
Obviously, it is workers who suffered most from the sanctions. The impact of sanctions 
on workers can be described by using the SGIM and a preliminary survey on workers in 
the garment industry and some other manufacturing sectors (hereafter Survey on 
Workers in Manufacturing Sector in Myanmar or SWMM). SWMM was conducted at 
the same time as the SGIM. A hundred workers were selected from garment factories 
for interviews in SGIM. Another hundred workers were selected from other 
manufacturing factories for comparison. With the permission of their employers, a 
group of ten workers or less was selected from 12 garment factories located in Yangon 
and Bago. These were again selected for convenience of interviews. Sampling was 
rather arbitrary and may not properly represent the general situation of workers in the 
garment industry. Another hundred workers were selected in the same way from 10 
factories in Yangon. These factories included soft drinks, confectionery, peanut oil, flour, 
pharmaceuticals, fertilizer, detergent, paint, and electronics. Primary data used in this 
research included that gathered from workers employed in the garment industry. 
However, data on workers of other sectors is mentioned when relevant. 
Before discussion, sample workers of SWMM will be described. Out of 100 workers 
who were employed in the garment industry, 87 were female; 76 of these were not 
married. This may be contrasted with the case of a hundred workers in other 
                                                  
29  A firm engaged in sewing was also excluded since its production volume was 
disproportionately large. 
30 The author counted only two kinds of sewing machines: straight lockstitch and 
overlock. These two are the main kinds of sewing machines used in the garment 
industry in Myanmar. 
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manufacturing sectors. For this case, out of 100 workers, only 21 were female, and 17 of 
these were not married. It is considered common knowledge that the garment industry 
employs many young female workers. Most of them are Myanmar (Bamar), but there 
are some exceptions. These include ethnic minorities such as Mon, Kayin and Shan. The 
average term of employment at present establishments was 3.6 years, and this is almost 
same as that of workers in other manufacturing sectors. The majority of workers come 
from Yangon and its vicinity. Fifty workers came from Yangon City, and six came from 
Yangon Division other than Yangon City. Eighteen came from Bago Division, and eleven 
came from Ayeyarwaddy Division. Both of these divisions border Yangon. Forty-two 
workers migrated from elsewhere to their present places in Yangon and Bago. On 
average, they migrated 4.6 years ago. Sixty-two workers lived with their families, and 
16 lived with their relatives and/or friends. The remaining 22 apparently lived alone, 
and they are most likely migrant workers.31 As for educational background, there were 
no illiterate workers, but three workers had only primary education. Thirty-eight 
workers attended middle school; 39 attended high school, and 19 passed the 
matriculation examinations and/or attended university/college.32 They worked 54 hours 
per week on average. 
According to SGIM, the average wage of sewing-machine-operators in 2004 was 
17,800 Kyats per month. This was about US $18 to US $20 at parallel exchange rates.33 
This figure is supported by the data from SWMM as well. According to SWMM, the 
average wage of one hundred workers employed in garment factories, not necessarily 
sewing-machine-operators, was 21,600 Kyats per month in mid-2005. This was about 
US $18 to US $22 at the parallel exchange rates.34 Moe Kyaw [2001:154] also reported 
that in late 2000, the average monthly wage of workers in the garment industry was 
about US $20. The average wage of workers in the garment industry, in US dollars to 
which international buyers tend to respond, does not seem to have declined, even after 
the sanctions. The above-mentioned figures included all compensation such as 
attendance and performance bonuses as well as overtime.  It means that the “real” 
                                                  
31 Chaw Chaw [2003:207] presents a different observation, saying that “According to 
informants long resident in the industrial zones, rural-to-urban migration has 
increased remarkably. Although there is no segregated data on the place of origin of 
workers in industrial zones, interviews with factory employees indicate that workers 
from rural areas constitute more than two-thirds of all employees in each factory.” 
32 One attended a vocational school. 
33 The parallel exchange rates were about 900 Kyats per US $1 to 1,000 Kyats per US 
$1 in 2004. 
34 The parallel exchange rates were about 1,000 Kyats per US $1 to 1,200 Kyats per US 
$1 in mid-2005. 
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income of workers did not decline in the period between the time that sanctions were 
not in place and afterwards. However, interviews as well as anecdotal data indicate that 
there was a lack of, or at least reduced, overtime. This diminished real income of 
garment workers considerably and prompted them to quit their jobs (Kudo [2005b]). No 
doubt there was a decline in real income of those who worked in factories that could not 
maintain their operations after the sanctions. 
How much did earnings contribute to the entire household income? According to 
SWMM, on average, wages constituted nearly 60% of total household income. Even 
though wages are often regarded as supplementary income, as indicated earlier by 
Steinberg [2003], they were in reality the main income, and this was supplemented by 
secondary and tertiary income sources. These included jobs at factories and/or offices by 
other family members that generated 17%, family-owned businesses that earned 14%, 
and agriculture that provided 6% of total household income. If the samples are 
reasonably accurate in their representation of the general situation, a family that had 
members laid off from a garment factory, lost their main source of income. This had a 
substantial impact on the household. 
Some workers send part of their income to their families in hometowns or villages. 
According to Chaw Chaw [2003:217], between one-third and one half of worker income 
was sent home. The rest was spent on the worker’s own food, accommodations, clothing, 
and savings. This account is supported by data from SWMM. Out of 100 workers, there 
were 27 who sent part of their income to their home families. On average, they sent 34% 
of their income; their remittances accounted for 20% of the total income of their home 
family. Out of 27 recipient family households, fourteen were farmers, four were local 
private factory workers, four were civil servants, and four had their own businesses. 
In SWMM the fourteen farmer families were asked how many acres of agricultural 
land they held in their villages. Seven farmers did not hold any land to cultivate, and 
four families held 2 to 6 acres of land. Such a small amount of land would probably 
provide only a marginal level of subsistence, depending on land fertility. Only two 
families had 10 acres of land or more. Chaw Chaw [2003:217] also states: 
Daughters [working in a garment factory] of better-off farmers, defined as having more 
than 20 acres of farmland, do not have to send their income home. … Daughters whose 
parents are small landholders (less than 5 acres), tenant farmers or engage in off-farm 
activities, have to support their parents every month. 
Loss of such payments from daughters must have had a larger impact on poorer 
households in home villages than those with more land. 
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5. Conclusion 
There are two issues related to the impact of United States sanctions. The first 
concerns whether or not the sanctions effectively punish the Myanmar military 
government. Is the impact of sanctions big enough? The second is whether or not 
sanctions effectively targeted only the military government and its compatriots rather 
than ordinary people. Did sanctions disproportionately impact the military and leave 
the people intact? 
As far as the garment industry in Myanmar is concerned, research reported in this 
paper confirms a substantial adverse impact. The garment industry had grown with the 
United States and EU markets; the outright loss of one of these markets created 
considerable damage. It will no longer grow at a rapid rate similar to some LDC’s in 
Asia. Nevertheless, it will not die as long as it has access to EU and Asian markets, and 
the Japanese market in particular. The impact was just large enough to deprive it of the 
possibility of being a leading industry in Myanmar. United States sanctions actually 
harmed a potential growth industry that could alleviate widespread poverty in a least 
developed economy, where labor-intensive manufacturing industries were and are 
necessary to mobilize both the unemployed and the underemployed labor force in urban 
and rural areas. 
How can the impact on people be evaluated? Burma Campaign UK [2004:5] says: 
The majority of Burma’s people, especially the poorest, work within the informal economy, 
which is generally not dependent on foreign investment or markets. The impact of 
sanctions that are targeted at the formal economy would therefore be minimal for the vast 
majority of Burma’s people. 
It is true. Taking into account the insignificant size of the garment industry in 
Myanmar, sanctions did not damage the majority of the population, especially those 
residing in rural areas. Burma Campaign UK [2004:9] also claimed: 
The nature of Burma’s economy is such that sanctions targeting foreign investments and 
international trade will impact on the regime while having a minimal impact on the 
majority of ordinary civilians. 
In reality, it did not impact either the regime or the majority of population. 
To be fair, however, the balance of impact weighed most heavily on the ordinary 
population, since these people lost their jobs and livelihood. In many cases, the loss of 
jobs for garment workers meant the loss of major income sources for their families in 
Yangon and their parents’ families in hometowns and villages. Moreover, even though 
sanctions were apparently targeted at governmental, military, and foreign companies, 
the most damaged entities were domestic private garment firms. Some critics say that 
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Myanmar domestic firms must have been swept away when they were faced with more 
severe competition following the abolishment of the MFA. Such may be true, but such 
prophecy is arguable itself. One certain fact is that sanctions did not have as much of an 
impact on military-related enterprises as they did on domestic private firms. Quite the 
opposite, foreign companies, including joint ventures with UMEHL, raised their relative 
importance in the garment industry under selection and polarization, a process fueled 
by the sanctions. It is ironic to see that enterprises originally targeted by the sanctions 
now play a more important role and are more entrenched in their position in the 
industry than they were before the sanctions. 
Like many other sanctions of the United States, the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act of 2003 had a disproportionately greater impact on the people than it did 
on the military regime. Though this paper does not include the argument that overall 
effects of the sanctions were behavior modification (Seekins [2005:440]), it must be 
stated frankly that there are no observed signs that the military intends to change its 
behaviors or attitudes on freedom and democracy.  
It would be a bad joke to claim that it is the effectiveness of the sanctions that even 
now drives the military, together with all the administrative organs and civil servants, 
to a small rural town in central Myanmar. 
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APPENDIX: SURVEY ON GARMENT INDUSTRY IN MYANMAR (2005) 
 
1. Objectives 
The IDE study team conducted a survey of garment firms in Myanmar in 2005 with 
the aim of gaining an understanding of the current situation of the 
garment-manufacturing sector following implementation of United States sanctions. 
The questionnaire was prepared and tested by the author of this paper, and a market 
research company, in collaboration with MGMA, collected data. 
 
2. Coverage and Surveys 
The survey was designed to cover all export-oriented garment firms including those 
engaged in sub-contracting work. With the cooperation of MGMA and a market research 
company in Yangon, an attempt was made to construct a complete list of existing 
garment firms in mid-2005. Original information gathered for the latest version of 
Myanmar Textile and Garment Directory (MTGD), now under compilation, was used. As 
a result, 165 garment firms were identified as operating firms. However, the actual 
survey was done on 142 firms, because 22 firms declined to answer the questionnaire, 
and one firm was already under liquidation. 
Trained staff of the market research company conducted actual surveys for data 
collection for the period between June and September 2005. The author joined the 
survey administration twice in June and September 2005. The author conducted 
interviews with garment owners, managers, and workers during these surveys. These 
interviews were used in this paper. 
 
[Profile of Firms Surveyed] 
a. Location 
Yangon 141  Bago 1
 
b. Type of Firms 
Domestic Private 120
100% Foreign-Owned 16
Foreign Joint Ventures 6
(with MTI) (1)
(with UMEHL) (1)
State-Owned Enterprise 0
 
c. Year of Establishment 
Before 1989 2
1990 – 1993 2
1994 – 1997 30
1998 – 2001 84
2002 – June 2005 24
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